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Abstract—Due to the greater path loss, shadowing, and in-
creased effect of blockage in millimeter wave cellular networks,
base station sharing among network service providers has the
potential to significantly improve overall network capacity. How-
ever, a service provider may find that despite the technical
gains, sharing actually reduces its profits because it makes price
competition between service providers tougher. In this work, a
weighted scheduling algorithm is described, which gives greater
control over how the airtime resource is allocated within a shared
cell. It is shown that, under certain market conditions, there
exist scheduling weights such that base station sharing is more
profitable than not sharing for both service providers in a duopoly
market, while still achieving almost as much network capacity
as in a conventional base station sharing scenario. Thus, both
technical and economic benefits of base station sharing may be
realized simultaneously.
I. INTRODUCTION
Compared to conventional microwave frequencies, millime-
ter wave (mmWave) frequencies have several properties that
suggest greater technical benefits due to spectrum and base
station sharing among cellular network service providers. The
massive bandwidth available at mmWave bands is unlikely to
be fully utilized by any one service provider, and the narrow
beamwidth of mmWave signals decreases the likelihood of in-
terference due to uncoordinated spectrum sharing. Meanwhile,
the greater path loss and increased spatial degrees of freedom
necessitate a dense deployment of base stations, which may
be costly for a single service provider.
Early results in the literature suggest that in fact, mmWave
cellular networks can benefit on a technical level from resource
sharing [1]–[4], Under certain conditions (e.g. sufficiently
narrow beamwidth and low enough base station density) the
network capacity and the data rate experienced by most users
are higher when service providers share base stations and
spectrum, even without coordination. Some have suggested
that these technical gains may translate to economic gains.
For example, [1] claims that it is economical for mmWave
service providers to share resources because they can offer
the same quality of service while licensing less spectrum,
while [2] points out savings on costs including both spectrum
licensing and base station deployment. Similarly, [4] suggests
that a mmWave spectrum holder can earn additional revenue
by licensing the spectrum in a secondary market with the
condition of restricted interference to its own users.
However, even if service providers can reduce costs or earn
revenue from secondary licensing while keeping quality of
service the same, resource sharing can affect profits if it shifts
demand to a competing service provider, or if it changes
the market dynamics in a way that forces down the price.
Our previous work [5] suggests that mmWave cellular service
providers may be less likely to consider sharing resources in a
competitive market. In mmWave cellular networks, a service
provider with a large network (i.e. having more spectrum and
base stations) has a considerable advantage over a smaller
service provider - much more so than in an equivalent mi-
crowave network. With resource sharing, the large service
provider would lose this considerable competitive advantage
and would have to deal with stiffer price competition, and so
would be unwilling to consider resource sharing under certain
market conditions. Furthermore, a service provider with a large
network typically finds that it stands to gain much less from
pooling resources with a small service provider, than the small
provider does. Thus, we find that with standard base station
sharing, it is difficult to capitalize on both technical and profit
gains at the same time.
To address this issue, we turn to cooperative game theory,
where we find several methods for distributing the profits
of a coalition in a weighted manner among its members.
These methods have also been used to allocate network or
computational resources in various settings [6]–[9]. In this
work, we explore the feasibility of using a similar approach
to allocate airtime within a wireless cell among members of a
coalition of network service providers that share base stations,
with the goal of finding a resource allocation scheme under
which both technical and profit gains may be realized.
The contributions of this work are as follows:
• We describe a scheduling approach that allows for control
over how airtime is allocated among users in a shared
cell, so that it can be weighted according to the relative
contributions (in terms of base stations) of the network
service providers to which they subscribe. We show that
with this scheduling approach we can achieve almost all
of the efficiency gains associated with resource sharing,
while still preserving a difference in quality of service
between service providers.
• We formulate a simple resource sharing game, and show
that in a competitive duopoly market for mmWave cellu-
lar service, network service providers may be willing to
share base station resources with our proposed scheduler.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, in
Section II, we propose an approach to scheduling that weighs
users of different network service providers according to
their contributions to the pool of shared resources. Next,
in Section III, we show through simulations that with this
scheduler we can achieve almost the full technical sharing
gains (i.e. overall network capacity) while still distinguishing
between network service providers in terms of the quality
of service offered to subscribers. In Section IV, we model
a simple duopoly market as a game, and show that, under
certain conditions, both service providers in the market earn
higher revenue while sharing resources using the weighted
scheduler. Finally, in Section V we conclude with discussion
and suggestions for future work.
II. SCHEDULER FOR WEIGHTED RESOURCE SHARING
We consider a system with a set of wireless base stations
(BSs), users, and NSPs. Each BS is operated by one network
service provider (NSP), and each user subscribes to one NSP.
When there is no base station sharing, each user is served by
the closest BS operated by the NSP to which it subscribes.
However, when NSPs form a coalition to share base stations,
then their subscribers can be served by the closest BS that
is operated by an NSP that is a member of the coalition. All
BSs use the same unlicensed spectrum, regardless of whether
or not they are shared.
In this section, we propose a scheduler for allocating
downlink time slots in a shared wireless cell serving users of
multiple network service providers, that satisfies the following
design goals:
• The scheduler is opportunistic, so that it can take advan-
tage of the multi-user diversity that is a major factor in
the sharing gains observed in mmWave cellular networks.
• It is temporal fair, so that in the long term, the airtime
allocated to each user will converge to a predefined share
of the total airtime.
• By setting the predefined shares, we can differentiate
between subscribers of multiple NSPs so that a large NSP
can maintain some competitive advantage.
We adopt a modified scheduler based on the multicell
temporal fair opportunistic scheduler proposed in [10]. At each
time slot, the scheduler selects a user j∗ = argmaxj(Rj +
γbj), where Rj denotes the estimated data rate of the user j
(using a pilot sequence) and bj is a credit parameter updated
as ∀j : bj = bj + aj − 1{j=j∗} to achieve long-term temporal
fairness among the users. This scheduler guarantees that the
temporal share of user j (i.e. the fraction of the time slots
in which user j is chosen) converges to a predefined weight
aj (
∑
j aj = 1) while exploiting the multi-user diversity to
increase the total throughput in the cell [10]. In other words,
this scheduler can be viewed as an opportunistic fair credit-
based procedure where selected (not selected) users lose (gain)
credit and the algorithm parameter γ ≥ 0 is the weight of the
credit component. For very large γ, this scheduler is equivalent
to a round robin scheduler because the users are chosen almost
only based on their credit parameter. On the other hand, for
γ = 0 the scheduler is purely opportunistic and does not offer
temporal fairness.
The operation of the scheduler depends on the base station
sharing scenario:
• No base station sharing: all users in a cell are assigned
the same weight aj = 1Ni , where Ni is the number of
subscribers in the cell. All users in the cell subscribe to
NSP i, since with no BS sharing, users are only served
by a base station operated by the NSP to which they
subscribe. A user is not necessarily served by the closest
base station.
• Equal sharing: BSs are shared by a set of NSPs I . In
each shared cell, all users in the cell are assigned the same
weight aj = 1NI , where NI is the number of subscribers
(of any NSP in I) in the cell.
• Weighted sharing: BSs are shared by a set of NSPs I .
In each shared cell, users are assigned weights aj = ψiNi ,
where ψi is the weight assigned to NSP i ∈ I ,
∑
i∈I ψi =
1 and user j subscribes to NSP i.
Note that the total number of BSs in the system, and the total
number of users, is fixed, but cell boundaries are different
depending on whether BSs are shared or not. When BSs are
shared, users may be served by a closer BS, so the average
coverage area of a cell will decrease while the average number
of users served remains the same.
In the weighted sharing scenario, airtime is not equally
shared among all users in a cell, but is allocated based on
a per-NSP parameter ψi. This parameter can be adjusted in
order to differentiate between subscribers of different NSPs.
In Section IV, we will show that for certain values of ψi,
weighted sharing may be mutually beneficial for NSPs in a
duopoly market.
III. NETWORK SIMULATION
In this section, we show by means of simulation that in
the weighted sharing scenario, we can achieve almost the
same sharing gains observed for the equal sharing scenario
in a mmWave cellular network. First, we describe the system
model underlying the simulations. Then, we show simulation
results for a network with two symmetric NSPs (same density
of base stations and subscribers) and several networks with
two asymmetric NSPs.
A. Technical system model
Our simulation captures the following key characteristics of
mmWave networks:
• Channel model: We use the empirically derived line
of sight (LOS), NLOS and outage probabilistic channel
models for mmWave links from [11].
• Directional transmission: We use the antenna pattern
model described in [12] with model parameters represent-
ing an 8x8 antenna array at the BS and a 4x4 antenna
array at the user.
We consider a system with two NSPs, with a system model
similar to [5]. Each NSP i ∈ {1, 2} has BSs distributed in
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Fig. 1: Simplified antenna pattern with main lobe M , back
lobe m and beamwidth θ.
the network area using a homogeneous Poisson Point Process
(hPPP) with intensity λBi , and users whose locations are
modeled by an independent hPPP with intensity λUi . Also,
both NSPs use the same frequency band with bandwidth W .
Although it is possible to have strong interference due to the
shared frequency with no coordination, the narrow beamwidth,
increased channel loss, and large bandwidth (hence large
noise power) in mmWave networks means that noise and not
interference is usually the dominant effect [11].
Both BSs and users use antenna arrays for directional
beamforming. We approximate the actual array patterns using
a simplified pattern as in [12]. Let G(φ) denote the antenna
directivity pattern depicted in Fig. 1, where M is the main lobe
power gain, m is the back lobe gain and θ is the beamwidth
of the main lobe. In general, m and M are dependent on
the number of antennas in the array and M/m depends on
the type of the array. Furthermore, θ is inversely proportional
to the number of antennas, i.e., the greater the number of
antennas, the more beam directionality. We let GB(φ) (which
is parameterized by MB , mB , and θB) be the antenna pattern
of the BS, and GU (φ) (which is parameterized by MU , mU ,
and θU ) be the antenna pattern of the user.
We model a time-slotted downlink of a cellular system. For
path loss, shadowing, and outage, line of sight (LOS), and
NLOS probability distributions, we use models adopted from
[11]. We assume Rayleigh block fading to model small scale
channel variations. The data rate is modeled as
R = (1− α)W log2
(
1 + β
PGU (0)GB(0)H
NfN0W + Y
)
, (1)
where α and β are overhead and loss factors, respectively,
and are introduced to fit a specific physical layer to the
Shannon capacity curve [11]. Furthermore, P is the BS
transmitting power, and H is the channel power gain derived
from the model discussed above, incorporating the effects
of fading, shadowing, outage, and path loss. We assume
perfect beam alignment between BS and user device within
a cell, therefore the antenna power gain (link directionality) is
GU (0)GB(0) = MUMB . Finally, Nf , N0, W and Y are user
device noise figure, noise power spectral density, bandwidth,
and interference power, respectively.
B. Results
Using the model described in the previous subsection, we
simulate a mmWave network with the parameters given in
Table I.
TABLE I: Network parameters
Parameter Value
Frequency 73 GHz
Bandwidth (W ) 1 GHz
Total BS density
(
λB =
∑
i∈{1,2} λ
B
i
)
100 BSs/km2
Total user density
(
λU =
∑
i∈{1,2} λ
U
i
)
500 UEs/km2
BS transmit power P 30 dBm(
MB , mB , θB
)
(20 dB, -10 dB, 5◦)(
MU , mU , θU
)
(10 dB, -10 dB, 30◦)
Simulation area 1 km2
Rate model (α, β) (0.2, 0.5)
User device noise figure (Nf ) 7 dB
Noise PSD (N0) -174 dBm/Hz
Scheduler parameter (γ) 0.01
We simulate a network with two NSPs, and a fixed number
of BSs and users divided among the NSPs according to their
relative size ni. An NSP i has BS density λBi = niλ
B and
user density λUi = niλ
U . We consider the case of symmetric
NSPs (n1 = n2 = 0.5) and two cases of asymmetric NSPs
(n1 = 0.6, n2 = 0.4 and n1 = 0.7, n2 = 0.3).
The simulation results are shown in Figure 2. Figure 2a
shows the average user throughput. Figure 2b shows the
throughput for each NSP separately, as well as their sum.
The average user throughput is higher with equal sharing
than with no sharing for users of both NSPs (Figure 2a).
However, even in an asymmetric scenario, where one NSP
contributes more base stations to the pool of shared resources
than the other, users of both NSPs can expect exactly the same
average throughput. The larger NSP loses any competitive
edge it had in the market, which disincentivizes base station
sharing despite the higher average data rate experienced by its
users. With weighted sharing, however, ψ1 (and consequently,
ψ2) can be adjusted so as to preserve a distinction in the quality
of service offered to users of different NSPs. In Section IV we
will show that for some market scenarios, there are values of
ψ1 and ψ2 with which weighted sharing is mutually beneficial
for both NSPs.
Meanwhile, considering the average cell throughput (Fig-
ure 2b), we note that in the weighted sharing scenario the total
throughput achieved by NSP 1 and NSP 2 together, is almost as
high as in the equal sharing scenario. The equal sharing sched-
uler is slightly more opportunistic than the weighted sharing
scheduler, leading to higher overall throughput. However, in
the weighted sharing scenario, the network still benefits from
greater BS diversity and multiuser diversity than when there
is no sharing at all, capturing most of the potential sharing
gains.
IV. SIMPLE DUOPOLY GAME
We have shown in Section III that with the weighted sharing
scheduler, mmWave NSPs can benefit from technical sharing
gains (achieve an overall network capacity similar to equal
sharing) while still preserving a competitive difference in user
quality of service. This has the potential to create market
dynamics that are more favorable to resource sharing. In this
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Fig. 2: Average user and cell throughput in three sharing scenarios - no sharing, equal sharing, and weighted sharing - for
symmetric and asymmetric NSPs. The share of the total number of BSs belonging to NSP 1 and 2, n1 and n2 respectively,
are shown at the top of each panel. In the lower plot, we also show the total average throughput achieved by NSP 1 and
NSP 2 together within one cell, in addition to the individual throughputs measured by each NSP within the cell. The horizontal
axis shows how throughput varies with ψ1, the weight assigned to (the larger) NSP 1 in the scheduler. Error bars show 95%
confidence intervals. For the scenarios with equal sharing or no sharing, the throughput is flat with only minor variation within
the confidence intervals.
section, we investigate a simple duopoly market and show
that under some market conditions where equal sharing is not
mutually beneficial to both NSPs, weighted resource sharing
may be. In those markets where weighted sharing can be
mutually beneficial, we also give the range of ψ1 and ψ2 for
which both NSPs earn higher profits with weighted sharing
than with none.
A. Scenario
We consider a simple duopoly game involving three players:
a set of consumers, a dominant NSP 1 with size n1, and a
smaller NSP 2 with size n2 < n1 where ni represents the
share of base stations operated by NSP i. The game is played
in three stages:
1) NSP 1 sets the price of its service, p1.
2) NSP 2 sets the price of its service, p2.
3) Each consumer subscribes to one NSP or to neither.
Each NSP i ∈ {1, 2} seeks to maximize its profits
pii(pi) = piNi − ciNi (2)
where Ni is the number of subscribers of NSP i and will be
determined by the decisions of the consumers’ decisions in the
last stage of the game, and ci is the marginal cost to the NSP
of serving one subscriber. An NSP can increase its profits by
raising the price of service, but this will affect the number of
subscribers it captures.
Consumers trying to maximize their individual surplus
evaluate the competing services in terms of the difference
in size ni, with a larger network representing more base
stations and consequently better service, as well as in terms of
the difference in price pi. We have heterogeneous consumers
parameterized by taste parameter ω, which represents the
degree to which the consumer values the wireless service, with
ω distributed uniformly from [0, ωˆ]. The surplus of a consumer
of type ω subscribing to NSP i depends on the resource sharing
scenario, the network configuration, and the relative share of
base stations operated by its NSP. We use the average data rate
as a metric of utility, and for mmWave networks we model it
as a linear function of ni (which we confirm empirically with
the simulation in Section III), with a parameter µ capturing
the network configuration.
When there is no resource sharing, the surplus of a con-
sumer of type ω subscribing to NSP i is
u(ω, ni, pi) = ωµni − pi (3)
for i ∈ {1, 2}, and a consumer subscribes to at most one NSP.
If the NSPs share their mmWave network resources, then
the surplus of a consumer of type ω subscribing to NSP i is
u
(
ω,
∑
k∈{1,2}
nk, pi
)
= ωµ
∑
k∈{1,2}
nk − pi (4)
since the quality of service of the consumer depends on the
total number of base stations deployed by both NSPs.
Finally, with weighted sharing, the surplus of a consumer
of type ω subscribing to NSP i is
u
(
ω, ψi,
∑
k∈{1,2}
nk, pi
)
= ωµψi
∑
k∈{1,2}
nk − pi (5)
where the utility now also depends on the weight assigned
to NSP i in the scheduler, ψi. (We see from Figure 2a that
the average user throughput for a subscriber of NSP i scales
linearly with ψi.)
B. Solution
We can solve the simple game described above for the best
response of each player, and use this to gain some insight into
the market. To do so, we define two marginal consumers:
• ω is the consumer who is indifferent between subscribing
to the smaller NSP (NSP 2) or to neither.
• ω is the consumer who is indifferent between subscribing
to NSP 1 or NSP 2.
We also note that the market share of NSP 1 is
ωˆ − ω
ωˆ
(6)
and the market share of NSP 2 is
ω − ω
ωˆ
. (7)
Since
ωµn1 − p1 = ωµn2 − p2 (8)
and
ωµn2 − p2 = 0 (9)
when there is no resource sharing, we find that
ω =
p2
µn2
(10)
and
ω =
p1 − p2
µ(n1 − n2) (11)
and that when p1p2 >
n1
n2
, there are positive values of p1, p2,
n1 and n2, where 0 ≤ ω ≤ ω ≤ ωˆ (i.e. both NSPs will have
positive market share).
Substituting (10) and (11) into (2) and using backward
induction, we find that the best responses of NSP 1 and NSP 2
are
p∗1,NS =
(2 c1 + c2)n1 − c1n2 + 2µωˆn1(n1 − n2)
2 (2n1 − n2) (12)
and
p∗2,NS =
4c2n
2
1 +
(
2c1 − c2 + 2µωˆ(n1 − n2)
)
n1n2 − c1n22
4n1(2n1 − n2)
(13)
In the equal sharing scenario, the consumer selects one NSP
over the other based only on price, since it will get the benefit
of all base stations by subscribing to either NSP. Therefore,
the NSPs will have to compete on price in order to attract
subscribers, and if either NSP sets a lower price, it will capture
all of the subscribers. If both NSPs have the same marginal
cost (c1 = c2 = c), then the best response is
p∗1,ES = p
∗
2,ES = c (14)
and from (2) we can see that both NSPs will earn zero profit.
If one NSP has a lower marginal cost, it will undercut the
other (e.g. if c1 < c2, then p∗1 = c2− ) and capture all of the
potential subscribers, leaving the NSP with higher marginal
cost to have zero market share. Thus for this simple duopoly
game, there is no way for both NSPs to earn a profit greater
than zero with equal sharing.
Finally, we consider the scenario with weighted sharing.
Here, since
ωµψ1(n1 + n2)− p1 = ωµψ2(n1 + n2)− p2 (15)
and
ωµψ2(n1 + n2)− p2 = 0 (16)
we find that
ω =
p2
µψ2(n1 + n2)
(17)
ω =
p1 − p2
µ(n1 + n2)(ψ1 − ψ2) (18)
and that when p1p2 >
ψ1
ψ2
and ψ1 ≥ ψ2, there are positive values
of p1, p2, ψ1, ψ2, n1 and n2, where 0 ≤ ω ≤ ω ≤ ωˆ (i.e.
both NSPs will have positive market share).
Then, substituting (17) and (18) into (2) and using backward
induction, we find that the the best response of NSP 1 is
p∗1,WS =
2µωˆψ1(ψ1 − ψ2)(n1 + n2) + (2c1 + c2)ψ1 − c1ψ2
2(2ψ1 − ψ2)
(19)
and the best response of NSP 2 is
p∗2,WS =
ψ1ψ2
(
2µωˆ(n1+n2)(ψ1−ψ2)+2c1−c2
)
+4c2ψ
2
1−c1ψ22
4ψ1(2ψ1−ψ2)
(20)
C. Simplified game with zero marginal costs
When c1 = c2 = 0, we show that there are conditions under
which weighted sharing may be mutually beneficial for both
NSPs. (Recall this in this game, there are no conditions under
which both NSPs can earn profit greater than zero with equal
sharing.)
With zero marginal costs, and when there is no resource
sharing, NSP 1 earns profit
pi1,NS =
µωˆn1(n1 − n2)
2 (2n1 − n2) (21)
and NSP 2 earns profit
pi2,NS =
µωˆn1n2(n1 − n2)
4 (2n1 − n2)2 (22)
With weighted sharing, NSP 1 earns profit
pi1,WS =
µωˆψ1(ψ1 − ψ2) (n1 + n2)
2 (2ψ1 − ψ2) (23)
and NSP 2 earns profit
pi2,WS =
µωˆψ1ψ2(ψ1 − ψ2)(n1 + n2)
4 (2ψ1 − ψ2)2
(24)
We are interested in finding values of n1, n2, ψ1, and ψ2 =
1−ψ1 for which weighted sharing is more profitable for both
NSPs than no sharing, i.e. pi1,WS > pi1,NS and pi2,WS > pi2,NS.
For NSP 1, we find that if ψ1 > n1n1+n2 then pi1,WS > pi1,NS.
For NSP 2, if there exists values for n1, n2, ψ1, and ψ2 =
1− ψ1 such that
n1
n1 + n2
< ψ1 <
4n21 − 5n1n2 + 3n22 +
√
∆
4 (2n1 − n2)2
, (25)
with ∆ = 16n41−8n31n2−15n21n22+10n1n32+n42, then pi2,WS >
pi2,NS (and under these conditions, we also have pi1,WS > pi1,NS,
so weighted sharing is mutually beneficial).
Figure 3 illustrates the range of n1 and n2 in which sharing
can be mutually beneficial, i.e., where there is a positive ψ1
and ψ2 = 1−ψ1 such that pi1,WS > pi1,NS, pi2,WS > pi2,NS, and
n1+n2 ≤ 1. In general, weighted sharing is most helpful when
NSPs are similar in size. Ordinarily, similar-sized NSPs must
compete on price, since there is little else to distinguish them;
in a weighted sharing scenario, however, they can vary ψ1 in
order to differentiate themselves and make price competition
less tough. For NSPs that are already dissimilar, the benefit of
weighted sharing for easing price competition does not apply.
Fig. 3: The shaded region shows the values of n1 and n2
(n1 > n2) where there is a positive ψ1 and ψ2 = 1 − ψ1
such that pi1,WS > pi1,NS, pi2,WS > pi2,NS, and n1 + n2 ≤ 1.
Furthermore, the depth of the shading gives the maximum
value of ψ1 for which this holds. The minimum value of ψ1
for which sharing is profitable for both NSPs is n1n1+n2 .
Next, we discuss the specific values of ψ1 and ψ2 = 1−ψ1
for which sharing is mutually beneficial. For weighted sharing
to be more profitable than no sharing for NSP 1, ψ1 should
be at least n1n1+n2 , i.e., the share of the airtime allocated to
NSP 1 should be at least equal to its share of the resources. The
maximum value of ψ1 for which sharing is mutually beneficial
is shown in Figure 3, and may be somewhat larger than n1n1+n2 ,
especially when n1 is not much larger than n2. The intuition
behind this surprising result is based on the dynamics of price
competition between the NSPs. The more similar the sizes of
the NSPs, the tougher the price competition gets, as consumers
differentiate between them mainly based on price. Thus with
no sharing, similar-sized NSPs must set a low price and make
little profit. With weighted sharing and large ψ1, however, the
NSPs are differentiated in the quality of service they offer
to consumers. Subject to less price competition, both NSPs
can set a higher price and earn more profit than they would
with no sharing, even though the quality of service offered by
NSP 2 is lower with weighted sharing and large ψ1 than with
no sharing at all, as shown in Figure 2a.
Similar-sized NSPs could also be differentiated in quality
by making ψ1 small, so that the quality of NSP 2’s service
would be much better than NSP 1’s. However, because of the
greater market power afforded to NSP 1 by its position in the
game, it can generally set higher prices without sharing and
so it would not be more profitable with weighted sharing and
ψ1 <
n1
n1+n2
.
The key result of this section is that there exists a range of
market conditions (n1 and n2) in the duopoly game, for which
weighted sharing can be more profitable than no sharing for
both NSPs. Furthermore, in Section III, we have shown that
weighted sharing achieves almost the full sharing gains from
a purely technical perspective (in terms of network capacity).
Thus, under the right market conditions, base station sharing
with a weighted scheduler may be beneficial from both a
technical and economic perspective.
V. CONCLUSIONS
While resource sharing, and base station sharing in par-
ticular, can increase overall network capacity in a mmWave
cellular system, NSPs may still be unwilling to share due to
unfavorable competitive dynamics with equal sharing. In this
work, we describe a scheduling approach with which we may:
• achieve an overall network capacity similar to an equal
sharing scenario, capturing most of the potential gains
due to BS diversity and multiuser diversity, and
• still maintain enough of a competitive difference between
asymmetric NSPs in a duopoly market so that sharing is
profitable for both.
In particular, with this approach, an NSP can achieve technical
sharing gains without losing its competitive edge in the market.
We briefly discuss here some limitations of our approach.
We make some approximations for tractability, such as approx-
imating the average data rate as a linear function of the number
of base stations, and approximating the average number of
users in a cell as fixed in Section IV (when in fact this depends
on the consumers’ decisions in the game). We also use a very
simple model for the game described in Section IV, although
we believe this model sufficiently captures the key details of
the market to support our general conclusions.
As future work, we would like to extend the model of
the duopoly game in Section IV to model the dependence
of consumers’ decisions on the network data rate. We would
also like to consider the application of our weighted sharing
scheduler to other kinds of networks, such as small cell
microwave networks and WiFi networks.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work was supported by the National Science Foun-
dation under Grant No. 1547332, 1302336, and the Graduate
Research Fellowship Program, by the New York State Center
for Advanced Technology in Telecommunications (CATT),
and by NYU WIRELESS.
REFERENCES
[1] A. K. Gupta, J. G. Andrews, and R. W. Heath, “On the feasibility
of sharing spectrum licenses in mmWave cellular systems,” IEEE
Transactions on Communications, vol. 64, no. 9, pp. 3981–3995, Sept
2016.
[2] M. Rebato, M. Mezzavilla, S. Rangan, and M. Zorzi, “Resource sharing
in 5G mmWave cellular networks,” in 2016 IEEE Conference on
Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS), April
2016, pp. 271–276.
[3] F. Boccardi, H. Shokri-Ghadikolaei, G. Fodor, E. Erkip, C. Fischione,
M. Kountouris, P. Popovski, and M. Zorzi, “Spectrum pooling in
mmwave networks: Opportunities, challenges, and enablers,” IEEE Com-
munications Magazine, vol. 54, no. 11, November 2016.
[4] A. K. Gupta, A. Alkhateeb, J. G. Andrews, and R. W. Heath, “Gains
of restricted secondary licensing in millimeter wave cellular systems,”
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 34, no. 11,
pp. 2935–2950, Nov 2016.
[5] F. Fund, S. Shahsavari, S. S. Panwar, E. Erkip, and S. Rangan, “Resource
sharing among mmwave cellular service providers in a vertically differ-
entiated duopoly,” IEEE International Conference on Communications
(ICC), 2017.
[6] C. Singh, S. Sarkar, A. Aram, and A. Kumar, “Cooperative profit sharing
in coalition-based resource allocation in wireless networks,” IEEE/ACM
Transactions on Networking, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 69–83, Feb. 2012.
[7] M. Iturralde, A. Wei, T. Ali-Yahiya, and A.-L. Beylot, “Resource
allocation for real time services in lte networks: Resource allocation
using cooperative game theory and virtual token mechanism,” Wireless
Personal Communications, vol. 72, no. 2, pp. 1415–1435, Sep 2013.
[8] J. Cai and U. Pooch, “Allocate fair payoff for cooperation in wireless ad
hoc networks using Shapley value,” in 18th International Parallel and
Distributed Processing Symposium, April 2004.
[9] R. T. B. Ma, D. M. Chiu, J. C. S. Lui, V. Misra, and D. Rubenstein,
“On cooperative settlement between content, transit, and eyeball internet
service providers,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, vol. 19,
no. 3, pp. 802–815, June 2011.
[10] S. Shahsavari and N. Akar, “A two-level temporal fair scheduler for
multi-cell wireless networks,” IEEE Wireless Communications Letters,
vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 269–272, June 2015.
[11] M. R. Akdeniz, Y. Liu, M. K. Samimi, S. Sun, S. Rangan, T. S.
Rappaport, and E. Erkip, “Millimeter wave channel modeling and
cellular capacity evaluation,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Com-
munications, vol. 32, no. 6, pp. 1164–1179, 2014.
[12] T. Bai and R. W. Heath, “Coverage and rate analysis for millimeter-wave
cellular networks,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications,
vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 1100–1114, 2015.
